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Abstract. As global macroeconomic uncertainties grow, there are notable shifts and 
oscillations in Chinese outbound investment and cross-border investment flows. This study 
shows China’s key investment characteristics including geographical preferences, 
investment compositions, and structural changes in industrial and foreign policies, such as 
Made in China 2025, financial liberalization, and OBOR. While these trends seem 
contradictory at times, opportunities are available for nimble and creative players who 
could capitalize on China’s increasing demand in the new economy (“xin jing ji”), with 
adequate consideration of regulatory scrutinies. 
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1. Introduction  
he global investment atmosphere has changed substantially over the 
past five years. While China’s cross-border investments have shifted 
along with the broader trade trends, they have also exhibited 
characteristics all of its own in response to various stimuli including 
numerous domestic policy changes and the evolving relationship between 
China and other major economic entities. 
It would be out of context to discuss Chinese cross-border trends in the 
past few years without an examination of the ever-changing global 
economic landscape. Before diving into the main drivers of cross-border 
investments in China and their impacts on investments under policy 
changes, it is worth first having a look at the larger picture. According to 
the IMF’s World Economic Outlook Reports published in October 2018, 
there has been a steady but less balanced expansion of economic growth 
that increases downside risks to global growth, while receding potential for 
upside surprises. Meanwhile, the Economic Policy Uncertainty Index has 
also increased to 907.45 in December 2019 compared to the February 2014 
low of 66.53.1 
Over the last five years, we’ve witnessed significant geopolitical changes 
and economic upheavals. The historical significance of Brexit and its 
influence over not only the European Union but the world economy is still 
an unresolved question mark. Tensions from the US-China trade disputes 
add even more risks to the global market, exhibiting ever-increasing 
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characteristics of protectionism that can threaten the stability of world 
trade and GDP growth. The volatility and expansion of oil prices is a major 
concern, especially after a prolonged period of general downward trending 
pricing in the last five years after reaching and sustaining highs, as it’s an 
important input for economies. A current pullback after recent localized 
highs is a positive sign for economies especially after the price drop of 
December 2018.2 There are still other risks that remain for the M&A market. 
According to UNCTAD’s World Investment Report 2019, global foreign 
direct investment (FDI) flows slid by 13% in 2018, the third consecutive 
annual decline.3The slowdown of global capital flow is in tandem with the 
poorer performance of the Chinese market, as it is one of the major 
contributors. PwC estimates that ever since the 2016 “mega-year”, China’s 
outbound investment has fallen for three straight years, partly due to the 
“greater scrutiny of larger cross-border M&A in many jurisdictions and a 
generally uncertain environment for the overseas deal-making.” 
One of the major themes of Chinese cross-border trade in the last five 
years has been the explosive growth of Chinese outbound deals. Outbound 
M&A volume rose from US$68.8bn in 2010 to US$196.2bn in 2016 and from 
fifth to second globally by country rank.4  Since the record 2016 highs, 
China’s outbound M&A has plummeted to a 10-year low due to trade 
tensions and economic slowdown, standing at US$41 bn, less than a fifth of 
the 2016 peak. While this growth has been more publicized, some other 
important details have not been as emphasized. While Chinese companies 
were involved in ten of the largest deals worldwide in 2016 (> US$1bn), 
however, most deals were in the middle market with a median ~US$30m 
deal size. While the absolute dollar values have increased, there is arguably 
further room for growth as this volume as a percent of GDP is smaller for 
Chinese companies (0.9%) than its counterparts in Europe (>2.0%) and US 
(1.3%) in 2015.  
With increasing global economic uncertainties, the total number of 
mega-deals has remained flat in recent years with significantly fewer large 
outbound transactions offset by a surge in the number of domestic mega-
deals. The latest figures suggest that the value of China’s overall M&A fell 
by 18% in the first half of 2019, the largest single-period decline over the 
last decade. Although PE deals fell sharply by 46%, volumes of both 
inbound and outbound transactions in most sectors have increased, 
indicating an opportunity for smaller cross-border transactions. 5 As 
investors deploy more cash to PE investments as valuations recede, this 
should be a temporary trend. Meanwhile, businesses have renewed their 
focus in the domestic market, as global economic uncertainties limit 
outbound opportunities. China’s domestic strategic M&A has picked up by 
8% in value and 12% in deal volume, while foreign inbound investments 
rose by 64% in volume but declined by 29% in value.  
North America and Europe saw further declines in Chinese FDI in the 
first half of 2019 as trade tension and Brexit uncertainty bit in, with just 
US$12.3 bn, down 18% from the same period last year and the lowest 
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activity since 2014, as estimated by Rhodium Group. Asia and Oceania 
emerged as the most popular outbound M&A destinations for Chinese 
enterprises, with nearly 60% of the total, according to a report by EY. In H1 
2019, both continents recorded double-digital growth, despite the overall 
contracting M&A trend –Asia (US$7.9 billion, up 21.9% YOY) and Oceania 
(US$4.2 billion, up 38.3% YOY). 
Furthermore, it is also noted that Chinese overseas acquisitions worth 
US$100 million or less fell in 2019. Fewer smaller and mid-sized deals are 
being announced, while the overall value is boosted by a few large 
transactions. It may be disappointing to see the number of Chinese 
outbound mega-deals is significantly lower in 2019. Offsetting some of this 
is the rising number of mega-deals from private equity and domestic 
strategic players. It is estimated that China’s outbound transactions alone 
have dropped 60% from 48 to 20 compared to 2016, 29% compared to the 
prior year of 24 deals.6 
 
2. Positive signs and structural optimization in the 
Chinese M&A market 
All these ominous signs don’t completely dampen the potential for the 
Chinese M&A market to thrive. Regional GDP in Europe, North America 
and especially the Asia Pacific (including China) are constantly growing. At 
the same time, comparing with pre-2008 financial crisis figures, there is 
significant liquidity and costs of funding and interest rates are still near 
historical lows, though we have observed an increasing 3-month LIBOR 
rate which will increase the hurdles needed to do deals, with all else being 
equal. This period of low US dollar interest rates has encouraged the 
development of the global M&A market and brought about Chinese 
business enthusiasm towards new cross-border investment and strategic 
opportunities. Although PwC data showed that Chinese outbound M&A 
fell in the first half of 2019, the announced total deal volumes actually 
increased in most sectors, including outbound, with the exception for PE 
transactions, which fell by 46%.To simply look at the dropping number of 
deal volume and deal value would be misleading if one overlooks the trend 
of steady and high-quality development behind China’s overseas 
investment. 
EY’s China Overseas Investment Report H1 2019 points out that the 
structure of cross-border deals is gradually being optimized and diversified 
with a focus on the new economy (“xinjing ji”), such as manufacturing, 
information transmission/software, and IT services, with 7.3% and 31.7& 
YOY growth respectively, against the backdrop of overall M&A 
investment. The high-end value chain continued to dominate China’s 
overseas M&As. By deal value, TMT (US$5.1 billion), consumer products 
(US$3.2 billion) and health & life science (US$2.1 billion) sectors accounted 
for more than 50% of the total. By deal volume, TMT (67), consumer 
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products (40) and advanced manufacturing & mobility (33) claimed over 
half of the deal flows.7 
There are many broad and sub-themes behind these intuitively contrary 
figures. One of the major Chinese policy drivers is President XI Jinping’s 
One Belt One Road (OBOR) initiative which aims to link countries along 
the old silk road through investment in infrastructure and increased trade. 
While this concept was first announced in 2013, the real traction kicked off 
earnestly in 2015 and was developed alongside the founding and backing 
of the Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank in 2013 and the Silk Road 
Fund in 2014. This focus on trade has driven a lot of cross-border and 
outbound investment to countries along the route. From 2014 to 2018, 
China committed to invest over US$1 trillion in about 1,700 projects across 
130 nations around the world, according to data released by the American 
Enterprise Institute.8This has amounted to US$14 billion in 66 countries in 
2018 compared toUS$1.9 billion in 2016, according to Thomson Reuters 
with an increase in M&A volume of over 627% from 22 to 160.9The aviation 
space, for example, has seen a surge of investment in airports, airlines, 
tourism activities, and aircraft leasing. While not necessarily required by 
China as it’s open to any country, Italy became the first member of the EU 
to sign on to OBOR with big expectations of usage in infrastructure.  
Another major theme and driver is the series of supply-side reforms that 
China has been implementing since 2015. All of the following different 
components are the overarching policy directions that have large effects on 
cross-border investments through changes in the operating environment 
for potential outbound companies. The main sub-category initiatives 
include cutting excess industrial capacity, deflating the real estate 
inventory and bubble, corporate deleveraging, lowering corporate costs 
(taxes, fees, etc.), and Made in China 2025.  
Some of these sub-themes are aimed at realigning the domestic economy 
and transforming it from the old to the new while making the sources of 
growth more sustainable. This would include cutting excess older 
industrial capacity and encouraging more clean energy projects. This goes 
hand in hand with overall deleveraging and control of the growth of the 
credit exposure in China as well as deflating the real estate bubble and 
excess inventory especially outside of top tier cities. This desire includes 
slowing down credit growth due to normal and shadow banking activities.  
There are two main ownership types in China: State-owned Enterprises 
(SOEs) and Private-owned Enterprises (POEs). SOEs refer to enterprises 
funded by the State and state-owned holding companies that belong to the 
State Council and the local people’s government on behalf of the State’s 
performance of investors’ duties. In China, SOEs control pillar industries 
like oil, electronics, and automobiles. Previously, the overall deleveraging 
measure focused on larger private companies and smaller banks, but now it 
has moved on to local municipal and provincial SOEs. Credit growth has 
intensified since the 2008-2009 global financial crisis and infrastructure 
spending and borrowing has been a key method to drive economic growth 
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by local governments. But lately, such initiatives have shut down projects 
such as new subways in farther out regions due to the concern for the 
amount of additional debt burden. These policies, however, have not 
dampened the growth of airports and related aviation infrastructure, 
especially in more western and more underdeveloped regions in China 
which have continued to see steady growth. As China is attempting to 
replace the US as the world’s largest aviation market in the next five years, 
the government plans to build 74 new airports by 2020 and 136 by 2025. In 
2019, Beijingunveiled the Daxing International Airport, with an initial 
capacity of 45 million passengers, but there are plans to expand the 
airport’s capacity to 72 million by 2025, and ultimately 100 million, 
according to the Centre for Aviation. There is an additional large capacity 
airport currently under construction in Chengdu with capacity for over 90 
million passengers.10The plan also does not include the general aviation 
airports whose numbers currently stand at 310 with the goal of reaching 
500 by 2020.11 
The lowering of corporate costs has not been as big a point of emphasis 
until recently. China has so far focused on reducing fees and bureaucracy 
rather than major tax cuts to stimulate the economy through 
encouragement of “mass entrepreneurship” by Premier Li Keqiang. This 
has especially been true of the test regions of policies such as the free trade 
zones like the Tianjin Dongjiang Free Trade Port zone (“DFTP”) and 
Shanghai FTZ which are the homes of the most active jurisdictions for 
aircraft leasing in China. These policies include the newly announced 
US$300bn of tax and fee cuts made at the beginning of 2019 and the recent 
additional US$50bn of cuts in government and operating service fees. 
These additional direct stimuli to spur businesses and individuals include 
cutting electricity, internet, portfolios, airport, and railroad charges. All of 
these are examples of levers that are unavailable for other countries to 
induce more growth. The reduction in airport development fund 
contributions is a huge gift for airlines amid other industry wide cost 
pressures. 
The Made in China 2025 (MIC 2025) industrial plan is also part of the 
overall supply-side reforms that have their roots in 2013, focusing on the 
upgrade of the Chinese industry similar to the “Industry 4.0” initiative 
enacted by Germany. The plan is the final installment of a series of China’s 
plans to move its industries up the value chain in order to reduce reliance 
on foreign technology. In the aviation world, this would entail a focus on 
new bio-fuels and clean technologies implemented for airlines, aircrafts, 
and airports. This theme is sometimes combined with the OBOR initiative. 
As China’s aviation market is expected to overtake the US as the world’s 
largest in the next five years, the country will need more than 7,000 planes 
in the next 20 years. Under MIC 2025, China expects home-made 
commercial aircraft, like COMAC C919 and ARJ21, to supply more than 
10% of the domestic market and its jetliners to account for nearly 20% of the 
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global market by 2025.12 This will give the aviation industry and its supply 
chain a renewed push in the structural optimization of the M&A market.  
Along with the supply-side reforms, the Chinese government has 
resolved to cut frivolous overseas investment. The appreciation of USD and 
the corresponding depreciation of the Renminbi in recent years have led to 
the boom of capital outflows in China due to the increased desire for 
offshore assets as well as perceived higher regional investment growth and 
returns. The number of high-profile cross-border investments carried out 
by Anbang and HNA Group has alerted the CBRC and caused a review of 
credit exposures for “systematic risk” to outbound groups. In addition, the 
government has stepped up scrutiny of both the convertibility of RMB to 
other liquid currencies and the transfer of funds to offshore locations.  
In 2017, the Chinese State-Owned Assets Supervision and 
Administration Commission issued several documents to regulate the 
investment of SOEs. It is now required that outbound investments be 
within the competencies of the business and core policy of the government 
to be supported. The aim to slow down and dampen the more frivolous 
offshore investments that are outside the scope of the main business 
competencies and to refocus on more core policy has driven investments 
which still have government backing. The corresponding response in the 
market has been a significant drop in overseas deal volume and value from 
the SOEs.  
The hurdles for overseas M&A have increased for Chinese enterprises. 
China has become much more selective about M&A deals struck by state-
owned enterprises, driven by caution in drawing down foreign exchange 
reserves as well as the effort of curtailing domestic debts. In 2018, SOEs 
only conducted 64 outbound deals—a 37% decrease compared to 2017 and 
a 50% decrease compared to 2016, with PwC commenting that SOEs have 
spent less money on outbound deals than at any time since 2014. SOEs are 
more focused on the internal restructuring under the supply-side reforms 
and have slowed down their overseas acquisitions. At the same time, a 
large number of private enterprises have taken up the lead and consist of 
nearly 50% of the total deal volume and value. Although private 
enterprises’ outbound investment has also dropped almost half compared 
to its peak in 2016, in the most recent year the group has announced 310 
deals (5 times more than its state-owned counterparts). Financial buyers are 
more capable of providing capital for overseas deals as well, as they have 
hit a new high for deal volume of 253 deals in 2018, a 6% increase from 
2017 and a 30% increase from 2016. The 2018 break down from SOEs to 
POEs is also higher compared with 2017 based on announced deals.  
The reforms of SOEs and industry structures in China not only help 
support the RMB exchange rate, but also total foreign reserves, which have 
steadily grown from the 1980s to the all-time high of US$4.0 trillion in June 
2014, though since receding to the recent low of US$3.0 trillion in January 
2017. Despite a slowing economy and an escalating trade war, China’s 
foreign exchange reserves have been gradually rising since late last year, 
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standing at US$3.1 trillion in December 2019, helped by tight capital control 
and rising inflow from foreign investors with renewed optimism towards 
the US-China negotiations, especially after the Phase 1 trade deal.13 
The Chinese foreign exchange reserves hit a low in October 2018 after 
the announcement of a 10% tariff on US$200 billion worth of Chinese goods 
by the US but are gradually recovering for the last four months with a 
growing optimism towards the US-China negotiations. 
 
3. China’s outbound M&A destination shift amid US-
China trade tensions 
Intensifying trade tensions and tightened regulatory scrutiny have been 
critical factors affecting the Chinese cross-border trend. In 2018, the total 
value of Chinese M&A deals in the US dropped 38% to US$13.2 billion. The 
drop accelerated in the first six months of 2019, as China’s M&A fell by 
18%, marking the largest single-period decline over the last decade, as 
estimated by PwC. Closer scrutiny illuminates a more sullen outlook. 
Chinese spending on acquiring US companies fell from its peak of 
US$55.3bn in 2016 to just US$3bn last year, a 95% drop, with American 
authorities rejecting several high-profile deals. Notably, China’s investment 
in the US technology sector plunged 79% to its lowest level in seven years. 
As a part of trade tensions, the US Committee on Foreign Investment 
(CFIUS) tightened the review of these announced deals after the US 
Congress finalized the Foreign Investment Risk Review Modernization Act 
of 2018 (FIRRMA) in August 2018, the first reform of national security 
review in the last decade. The law expands the array of deals CIFUS can 
review by including non-controlling foreign investments in the technology 
industry and prolongs the timing of the review, incurring a higher cost for 
firms waiting for the review results. Though the provision may not fully 
take effect for about another 18 months due to the reallocation of resources 
CIFUS needs for more intense future reviews, its effects are already starting 
to show in the market, and even those deals that are already completed are 
facing new threats.  
In an attempt to axe the largest transaction of 2018, CFIUS blocked the 
proposed US$1.2 bn merger between MoneyGram, a US money transfer 
business, and Ant Financial, a Chinese online payment company owned by 
Alibaba, citing national security concerns over data aggregation. In late 
March 2019, the US also required the Chinese owners of the dating app 
Grindr to give up their 60% share of the company. Beijing Kunlun Tech, 
who completed the buyout of Grindr early last year, is now under the 
charge of possible threats to US national security after the CFIUS decision 
due to data privacy issues. The announced deals of Chinese M&A are 
expected to continue decreasing if the hostility of the US-China trade war is 
not eased as Chinese companies are cautious when considering the rising 
costs and difficulties of such investments. Moreover, in recent years, 
Chinese companies have been pursuing smaller M&A deals to avoid the 
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CFIUS scrutiny. The CFIUS demand on Grindr after its transaction, which 
is a relatively small sum of $245 million, signals the future threats on small 
value Chinese tech acquisition and already completed suspicious deals. 
The EU was once the alternative destination of Chinese outbound 
investment, as it had contributed to 34% of the total Chinese M&A 
announced deal value in 2017, and in 2018 this number jumped to 59% as 
the deal value in the US had further decreased. 14  The “Big Three” 
economies (UK, Germany, France) still attract the most capital, but 
northern Europe and the Benelux (Belgium, Netherlands, and 
Luxembourg) also caught up in 2018. The most preferred destination in 
northern Europe is Sweden, who received EUR3.4bn of total investment in 
2018, driven by Zhejiang Geely’s EUR3bn investment in Volvo AB in 
2018.15The EU is and is likely to continue to be the most favorable foreign 
investment destination for Chinese businesses in the foreseeable future due 
to deteriorating US-China relations.  
With Boris Johnson's emphatic election victory accelerating the Brexit 
process as well as the European Union’s framework for screening FDIs, the 
announced value of China’s overseas M&As in Europe was US$3.6 billion 
in H1 2019, down 86.6% YOY, representing the largest decline in years. 
Similar to CFIUS, the EU framework reinforced the screening mechanism 
by asking member states to review investments not only directly from non-
EU countries, but also intra-EU investments involving non-EU ultimate 
owners: the proposal has been adopted and related legislation was 
approved by the European Parliament on February 14, 2019 and is to come 
into effect in 18 months. Although this new EU investment screening 
framework is not as aggressive as many OECD screening frameworks, it’s a 
significant landmark that will influence future Chinese investors’ decisions. 
The Rhodium Group 2019 report especially points out that some of its 
provisions “overlap with core characteristics of Chinese investment in 
Europe to date.” While most of the Chinese investments in the EU are 
targeted at European technology and innovation assets, many of these 
preferred sectors are demanded by the new screening rules to undergo 
special scrutiny. Also, since 60% of Chinese FDI in the EU is directed by 
state-owned or sovereign entities in China, the new rules’ requirement to 
review deals with funding backed by the state, not simply deals owned by 
state-control entities, will further create troubles for Chinese outbound 
investment in the EU. The new rules are built on a “coordination and 
cooperation” framework with a generally friendly gesture, but Chinese 
firms in the coming years may no longer enjoy the same level of 
convenience as before. 
As scrutiny intensified in Europe and the US, emerging economies in 
Asia and Oceania have become the most popular overseas M&A 
destinations for Chinese enterprises. Driven by the improved Sino-
Australia relations and the BRI, the announced M&A value by Chinese 
enterprises increased significantly in Oceania (US$4.2 billion, up 38.3% 
YOY), and Asia (US$7.9 billion, up 21.9% YOY), accounting for nearly 60% 
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of the total. The main sectors of China’s M&As in Asia are TMT, consumer 
products and financial services, while in Oceania, key sectors are health & 
life science, real estate, and hospitality & construction.16According to the 
Ministry of Commerce, China’s non-financial outbound direct investment 
(ODI) was US$53.8 billion in H1 2019, dropping by 5.9% YOY.17 Despite the 
overall downward trend, the main investment sectors were leasing and 
commercial services, and data indicated that the structure of China’s ODI 
remained healthy and optimized in 2019.  
 
4. New trends in domestic economy opening up 
Moving forward, China’s internal policy reforms and external pressures 
from the trade negotiation will dictate the country’s economic 
liberalization. With the size of the financial sector at US$44 tn, China has 
1.1 bn potential retail banking customers, who will have a US$14 tn asset 
pool under management by 2022. However, options to participate in 
China’s financial markets have been limited due to the regulatory barriers 
since its accession to the WTO in 2001. 
Recently, there have been more policies relating to opening up the 
domestic economy to foreign capital including publications of a national 
unified negative list of industries for inbound investments, which was 
previously more locally administered, as well as a pledge to open up 
investments in the financial institution space including asset management 
companies. The strongest indication of China’s willingness to change is 
President Xi’s commitment to implement the country’s “Opening-up 
Initiatives,” marked by the unification of its banking and insurance 
regulators to form the China Banking and Insurance Regulatory 
Commission (CBIRC) in 2018. Against such a background, China’s 
Financial Stability and Development Committee under the State Council 
announced a further 11 measures to ease foreign ownership limits on 
financial services firms in July 2019. 18  They encouraged global asset 
managers to accelerate the entry of foreign capital into China’s securities 
industry. 
The Phase 1 Trade Deal with the United States also ensured the removal 
of barriers to help US banking, insurance, and other financial services 
companies expand in China. Under the agreement, China has agreed to set 
up a clear deadline for removing foreign ownership caps on securities 
firms, including investment banking, underwriting, and brokerage 
operations, by nine months to April 2020. China’s commitment provides 
more stability for foreign investors especially in aircraft leasing and airlines 
and also prevents retroactive unraveling of deals due to unanticipated 
policies. This has prompted more foreign lessors to establish on-shore 
subsidiaries in China to attract more local customers.  
China’s retrenchment from outbound investment echoes the country’s 
renewed focus on financial liberalization catalyzed by domestic economic 
reforms and the trade deal with the US. The new measures, characterized 
by “faster rather than slower, sooner rather than later”, are in response to 
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encouraging market feedback on China’s commitment towards deeper 
institutional reforms and economic openness. 
While some of these macroeconomic drivers and domestic policies can 
seem a bit contradictory at times, what is certain is China’s encouragement 
of technologies and growth platforms that enhance the sources of GDP 
growth and composition, especially as China continues to liberalize its 
economy and become a driving force in technological innovation. There 
will be continued challenges as these policies and drivers change the global 
economy and industry. However, this bodes well for nimble and creative 
players who could capitalize on China’s increasing demand in the new 
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